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Financial performanceConventional microfinance institutions (MFIs) can promote financial inclusion, but they also prompt eth-
ical concerns regarding the social consequences of commercialization and high interest rates. Islamic
MFIs, which adhere to Sharia’s prohibition of riba (usually interpreted as a ban on interest), present an
alternative. Differences between conventional and Islamic MFIs in terms of outreach and financial sus-
tainability remain underexplored; no comprehensive data set details Islamic MFIs either. With new data,
collected with a global survey, the authors construct a unique panel of 543 conventional and 101 Islamic
MFIs, operating in Islamic and non-Islamic countries. These data suggest that the market for Islamic
microfinance is more important than previously recognized, has grown in recent years, and is likely to
continue growing in every region of the world. Statistical comparisons, using various estimation tech-
niques, regarding the outreach and financial performance of Islamic and conventional MFIs also reveal
that the breadth and depth of Islamic MFIs exceed those of conventional MFIs, though conventional
MFIs achieve stronger financial performance. This latter result is not robust though.
 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under theCCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFIs) generally strive to generate
positive social impacts while simultaneously delivering sound
financial performance to achieve a ‘‘double bottom line.” By the
end of 2017, 981 MFIs had submitted performance reports to the
Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX Market), which revealed
an estimated US$114 billion in loan volume and 139 million cus-
tomers (Valette & Fassin, 2018). That is, this sector clearly has
expanded to comprise a vast variety of organizations, which appear
heterogeneous in their approaches to achieving this dual mandate.
In response, a debate has cropped up, regarding which types of
MFIs may be most successful in realizing both objectives (e.g.,
Armendáriz & Morduch, 2010; Banerjee, Karlan, & Zinman, 2015;
Morduch, 2016). Some studies propose an influence of religion,
such as when Mersland, DÉspallier, and Supphellen (2013) argue
that Christian-based MFIs earn lower profits but also incur lower
funding costs than conventional MFIs. The specific financing prac-tices adopted by Islamic MFIs, such as interest-free forms of finan-
cial access, also might allow for greater outreach but require more
resources to manage, relative to conventional microfinance (Visser,
2013). To the best of our knowledge, rigorous comparisons of con-
ventional and Islamic MFIs, in terms of outreach and financial per-
formance measures, and thus their ability to achieve the double
bottom line, are lacking.
The question of whether conventional and Islamic MFIs perform
differently is particularly relevant, considering the increasing
interest in MFIs that offer products and services compliant with
Islamic financial principles (Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013).1
A large proportion of the world’s poor (700 million in 2013; World
Bank, 2013) live in Muslim-majority nations, sparking interest in
Islamic microfinance as a financial outreach tool. Even MFIs that pre-
viously offered only conventional microfinance products have
started offering Islamic versions, marketing them as effective tools
to facilitate and encourage small businesses (Ahmed, 2002). Yet Isla-
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duct portfolios, and management.2 For example, high interest rates
in the conventional MFI sector, in addition to being criticized as
unethical (Hudon & Sandberg, 2013), conflict with Islamic
prohibitions on microfinance products that involve paying or receiv-
ing riba.3 Conventional, for-profit MFIs charge significantly higher
interest rates when markets are less competitive (Baquero,
Hamadi, & Heinen, 2018), and several conventional MFIs have been
accused of acting like loan sharks, not only charging extremely high
interest rates but also using aggressive collection methods
(Boatright, 2014).
To investigate the possible trade-offs that Islamic MFIs confront
in pursuing a double bottom line, we therefore construct a novel
data set that reflects a comprehensive, global mapping of Islamic
microfinance service providers. Using an online survey that we
sent to all MFIs reporting to MIX Market, we identify MFIs cur-
rently providing microfinance products in line with Islamic princi-
ples, as well as those that plan to provide such products in the
future. This classification is novel, in that it relies on direct survey
questions about product offerings. We then align our findings with
databases provided by the microfinance network for Arab coun-
tries, Sanabel (2012) and the Islamic Banking Database (2014),
which establishes an MFI classification that is more comprehensive
than previous approaches, in terms of the regions covered and
number of Islamic MFIs included. We thus create a detailed, consis-
tent map of the supply and demand sides of the market for Islamic
microfinance products, according to global distribution trends. In
total, we identify 644 MFIs by type and specify 101 of them, based
in 33 countries that can be classified as Islamic MFI providers.
These comprehensive data suggest that the market for Islamic
microfinance is more important than is generally acknowledged,
and its recent growth appears likely to persist, in every geograph-
ical region.
Using this newly constructed data set, we also undertake a com-
parison of the performance of conventional MFIs and Islamic MFIs,
according to the dual objectives of social benefits and financial per-
formance. Fan, John, Liu, and Tamanni (2019) compare Islamic and
conventional MFIs too, using a sample of 300–600 observations,
depending on the outcome variable, containing 316 MFIs. For this
statistical analysis, we expand the sample to approximately 5000
observations, including 644 MFIs.4 The analyses suggest that Isla-
mic MFIs outperform conventional MFIs in terms of outreach, but
conventional MFIs might perform better financially. This latter result
is not robust though, which might reflect the endogeneity problems
that affect our results, despite our best efforts to reduce possible
sample selection problems by using cross-sectional, panel, and
instrumental variable regression techniques.
In Section 2, we outline the main characteristics of and products
offered by Islamic MFIs, along with a review of literature pertain-
ing to the social and financial performance of MFIs. We also
develop some testable hypotheses for our quantitative analyses.
Section 3 presents the variables for our empirical analysis, provides
some motivational statistics for our main analysis, and then details
the empirical methodology. After we outline the results, according
to our newly constructed data set and regression analyses, in Sec-
tion 4, we conclude in Section 5.2 Differences in financial sustainability also might reflect distinct sources of
funding, such as funding by Islamic charities and donations or other borrowers’
contributions, which are more prevalent in Islamic MFIs.
3 Many studies use interest and riba interchangeably, but they are not exactly the
same (Ugi, 2018). It is more accurate to state that Islam prohibits riba, not interest. Yet
the ban on riba is widely interpreted as a ban on interest by fiqh scholars who
specialize in Islamic jurisprudence.
4 Other comparative studies of Islamic and conventional MFIs offer conflicting
results, based on a more restricted set of Islamic MFIs, such as Widiarto and
Emrouznejad (2015) and Abdelkader and Salem (2013).2. Literature review and hypotheses development
2.1. Features of Islamic microfinance
Islamic microfinance offers an alternative to conventional
microfinance for meeting the financial needs of the poor and finan-
cially excluded (Karim, Tarazi, & Reille, 2008). The two microfi-
nance forms differ considerably from an operational perspective
(Ahmed, 2002). Even if some fundamental similarities apply to
the financial instruments or techniques, the products and services
provided by Islamic MFIs are free of particular elements
(Obaidullah, 2008), because their business activities must adhere
to halal (permissible) principles. For example, both conventional
and Islamic MFIs use equity and debt-based financing, but they
operationalize the instruments differently. Weill (2020) proposes
a summary of four main principles of Islamic (micro-)finance:
(1) Interest is forbidden.
(2) Lenders are rewarded through profit sharing, though the
most popular Islamic microfinance products do not reflect
conventional profit-and-loss sharing principles, as we dis-
cuss subsequently.
(3) The MFIs cannot finance activities considered sinful by
Islam, such as maysir (gambling) (Chong & Liu, 2009), alco-
hol, or borrowing and lending to conventional MFIs that
charge interest.
(4) Contract terms should be entirely clear and eliminate any
contractual uncertainty, due to the prohibition of gharar
(uncertainty).
The Sharia-compliant financial products that Islamic MFIs offer
can be broadly categorized into three types: (1) equity financing
instruments, such as mudaraba and musharaka; (2) credit or debt
financing instruments, including ijara, istisna, murabaha, qard e
hasan, and sala’m; and (3) other types of microfinancing, such as
asset-building products, typically in the form of saving accounts
(e.g., wadiah), investment deposits, or mutual insurance schemes
(e.g., micro-takaful). We address the first two categories in more
detail next but exclude the third category as this category is not
relevant for the analysis in this paper.2.1.1. Equity-like instruments
Equity financing relies on profit-and-loss sharing (PLS) arrange-
ments, rather than interest-based contracts, between an Islamic
MFI and its clients, to conform with Islamic principles (Khan &
Mirakhor, 1992). For example, under a mudaraba or trustee financ-
ing contract, the MFI is the investor (financier), and the MFI’s client
manages the enterprise. If the business generates profits, the fund-
ing parties split the gains according to some predetermined rule
(Visser, 2013). Thus, the profit shares are predetermined, but the
profits are unknown in advance (Weill, 2020). If the business
incurs a loss, it is borne exclusively by the Islamic MFI, but the
entrepreneur (i.e., client) receives no compensation. Under an
equity partnershipmusharaka contract, both the MFI and the client
instead contribute capital and share profits according to a prede-
fined rule, and they also jointly manage the business. Profits are
negotiated freely; losses are covered according to the capital con-
tributions of the MFI and the entrepreneur.Mudaraba is thus closer
to a limited partnership, whereas musharaka is similar to a busi-
ness model involving equity stakes with controlling rights.
Although a strict application of PLS principles reduces the risk of
insolvency for an Islamic MFI, the shareholders’ risk also might
transfer to depositors, in form of more volatile returns (Visser,
2013). In practice, Islamic banks often stabilize the profit distribu-
tions to depositors, but Islamic (and conventional) MFIs cannot
S. Ahmad et al. /World Development 136 (2020) 105130 3accept deposits (or savings) to begin with, and they often are not
subject to regulations by a Central Bank or other monetary author-
ity. Moreover, PLS contracts may increase information asymmetry
problems, relative to debt-based interest rate contracts (Weill,
2020). In particular, adverse selection problems probably grow
more acute with PLS contracts. Borrowers with low profit expecta-
tions prefer a PLS contract over an interest-based one, because the
amount they must share with the lender (i.e., a share of their small
profits) under a PLS contract probably is lower than a fixed interest
payment. But borrowers earning higher profits likely seek an
interest-based contract so they can pay a fixed payment, lower
than the share of their profits. Moreover, interest-based contracts
incentivize borrowers to work harder to earn high returns, because
they still pay the same, fixed amount, regardless of their profits. In
contrast, a PLS contract requires a higher payment if they earn
more, so borrowers might lack strong enough incentives to put
forth stringent effort. Such a scenario is likely to lead to moral haz-
ard problems.2.1.2. Debt-based instruments
Debt-based instruments instead do not align with PLS princi-
ples (Shahinpoor, 2009), so they may evoke higher risk for the bor-
rower, because repayment does not depend on the borrower’s
profits (Weill, 2020). For example, ijara is a lease purchase; the
MFI allows a client to use an asset it possesses, for a certain price
and period.5 With each payment, the lessee moves closer to a pur-
chase and transfer of ownership of the leased asset. Unlike tradi-
tional leasing though, all risks are borne by the MFI, including any
impairment or damage to the leased asset caused by factors outside
the client’s control, such as weather events. These terms are stated in
advance.
Istisna is an exchange contract that defers payment and delivery
of the product; theMFImight produce goods itself or buy them from
a third party, then deliver them to the end customer (i.e., client).
This contract refers to goods that have yet to be produced, such as
a building or road. The end customer might pay when the contract
is signed or at subsequent stages in the manufacturing process.
Instead, murabaha is a goods-financing contract, such that the MFI
acquires a requested product and resells it to the client for its cost
plus a markup to cover any service costs. It facilitates the purchase
and resale of commodities in rural areas in particular (Wilson,
2007). Murabaha can evoke high costs, often higher than conven-
tional financial products, because the Islamic MFI must physically
handle the goods, ensure they are properly stored, and insure them
(Visser, 2013). It also involves two sales transactions and thus
potentially two tax payments, though this issue should not be a con-
cern in relation to value-added taxes (VAT). The VAT or other ad val-
orem tax on conventional sales that require interest payments by
definition will be lower than the tax imposed on a murabaha sale
though, in which a markup gets added to the sales price.6
Qard e hasan is an interest-free loan. The borrower repays the
principal,withno return, reflecting the Islamicprecept thatMuslims
should help those in need, such as by supporting rural households or
giving prospective entrepreneurs a chance to start their business
(Abdul Rahman, 2007; Obaidullah, 2008; Wilson, 2007). A small
fee of approximately 0.5 percent may be charged to cover expenses.
Finally, sala’m is a forward sale, mostly used for agricultural
financing. The quality, quantity, time, and price of the goods to
be purchased must be fully specified, leaving no ambiguity
(Dhumale & Sapcanin, 1999; Obaidullah, 2008). The goods
included in these contracts cannot be gold, silver, or currencies.5 Here, we refer to a lease to buy (ijara wa iqtina, also known as ijara muntahia bi
tamleek), not an operational lease.
6 We thank an anonymous referee for noting this point.2.2. Social and financial performance of MFIs
Microfinance institutions, both conventional and Islamic, have
social and financial objectives. On the one hand, MFIs aim to
reduce poverty by providing financial services to poor households
that have been excluded from the formal financial system. On the
other hand, the MFIs themselves aim to achieve financial self-
sufficiency, without the need for subsidies (Tulchin, 2003). Achiev-
ing both objectives simultaneously is referred to as attaining the
microfinance promise (Morduch, 1999) or double bottom line
(Armendáriz & Labie, 2011). In practice, it remains difficult to reach
both objectives, which even may be subject to a trade-off. Accord-
ing to financial systems (Robinson, 2001) or self-sustainability
(Schreiner, 2002) approach, social performance and financial sus-
tainability can go hand-in-hand, because reaching more customers
should create economies of scale. If financially sustainable MFIs
attract more funds, it could increase their ability to serve more
poor people. A poverty lending (Robinson, 2001; Schreiner, 2002)
perspective instead implies the necessary trade-off between social
performance and financial sustainability, because providing finan-
cial services to the poor is expensive and can persist only by MFIs
that receive subsidies (i.e., not financially self-sustainable). The
high costs of lending primarily stem from the transaction costs,
in that poor people often live in remote areas, and high fixed costs,
even for small loan amounts. Theoretically, it is not clear whether
social and financial objectives trade off or are compatible; empiri-
cal studies appear necessary to address this debate.
Different contributions from empirical microfinance literature
also inform this discussion. In particular, some studies examine
the social and economic impacts of microfinance on end-users;
recent studies using randomized controlled trials tend to offer
strong criticisms. For example, Banerjee et al. (2015) conclude,
from a study across eight countries, that microcredit fails to induce
transformative effects or raise households out of poverty. Dahal
and Fiala (2020) instead argue that prior studies are severely
underpowered, such that it is impossible to establish whether
and how microcredit affects welfare. With their non-
experimental study in Sierra Leone, Garcia, Lensink, and Voors
(2020) provide evidence that microcredit offered through group
lending systems helps people release their internal psychological
constraints and develop aspirational hope, which may provide a
foundation for increased welfare in the future. Across these con-
trasting views though, a general consensus indicates that microfi-
nance is not a panacea. In particular, the social impact of
microcredit appears lower than early predictions suggested and
probably cannot lift large segments of poor populations out of pov-
erty, though that pessimistic conclusion may refer mainly to
microcredit, not necessarily the wider range of microfinance activ-
ities, such as microsavings and microinsurance. Furthermore, var-
ious groups of vulnerable people might respond to microfinance
activities in distinct ways, as implied by recent survey research
by Hansen, Huis, and Lensink (2020), Hermes and Lensink (in
press), and Lensink and Bulte (2019).
The disappointing results of microcredit also have induced
another stream of research that seeks tactics for improving its
impact (Lensink & Bulte, 2019). One option is to rethink the pro-
duct design; whereas traditional microcredit involves short-term,
group loans with rigid contract terms, more flexible repayment
terms, such as might be achieved through longer grace periods
(Field, Pande, Papp, & Rigol, 2013), could increase the impact of
microcredit. Another approach expands on microfinance, to go
beyond providing credit and also offer varied financial and non-
financial services, such as gender-based and business training.
Such offerings are broadly referred to as microfinance-plus
(Garcia & Lensink, 2019). Bulte, Lensink, and Vu (2017), with an
experimental study in Vietnam, suggest that combining credit with
4 S. Ahmad et al. /World Development 136 (2020) 105130business training may enhance the impacts. However, both more
flexible contract terms and microfinance-plus activities also have
financial consequences and may demand additional subsidies, with
detrimental impacts on the financial self-sufficiency objectives.
The pursuit of this second, financial objective seemingly has
prompted increasing commercialization of conventional microfi-
nance, which critics allege has created mission drift, increased con-
sideration of wealthier clients, the exclusion of poor and female
borrowers (Cull, Demirgüç-kunt, & Morduch, 2007), and a shift
toward more individual lending. Notably, de Quidt, Fetzer, and
Ghatak (2018a) provide theoretical and empirical evidence that
commercialization in conventional microfinance leads to greater
competition and shifts away from non-profit group lending and
toward for-profit individual lending. Commercialization induces
greater competition too, which arguably should increase the funds
available, such that it could have positive effects. With a simulation
exercise, de Quidt, Fetzer, and Ghatak (2018b) predict that the neg-
ative effects of monopolistic for-profit lending, due to commercial-
ization, are almost entirely compensated for by the results of
increased competition. Thus, the ultimate influence of commercial-
ization is ambiguous, and in practice, the MFI’s internal organiza-
tion appears important in determining these effects. Churchill
(2019) provides empirical evidence that non-profit MFIs are more
socially driven than for-profit ones, which instead may be more
concerned about financial returns, perhaps at the cost of their
social objective (Hermes & Lensink, in press).
Another closely related stream of literature explicitly focuses on
the supply side. That is, rather than investigating the impact of
microfinance on end-users by gathering individual-level data,
these studies address the MFIs themselves, with data at the MFI
level. Hermes and Hudon (2018) provide a systematic review of
such studies, but for our purposes, we note an interesting point
these studies raise, pertaining to the trade-off between social out-
reach and financial sustainability. From a supply-side perspective,
financial sustainability implies that MFIs’ activities do not result in
losses over time, such that they no longer need subsidies but still
can continue to provide microcredit (Balkenhol, 2007; Quayes,
2012). Such financial sustainability can be measured with standard
financial ratios such as the return on equity (ROE) or the return on
assets (ROA), though some researchers use the operational self-
sufficiency of MFIs, which reflects whether they can cover their
costs with revenues, or their financial self-sufficiency, which indi-
cates whether they can operate without ongoing subsidies, soft
loans, or grants. Finally, studies that use data envelopment or
stochastic frontier analyses tend to measure (financial) efficiency
(e.g., Caudill, Gropper, & Hartarska, 2009; Hermes, Lensink, &
Meesters, 2011; Servin, Lensink, & van den Berg, 2012; for a
meta-analysis, see Fall, Akim, & Wassongma, 2018).
From a supply-side perspective, outreach is the representation
of the social value created by MFIs, which can be measured by
two dimensions: depth and breadth (Navajas, Schreiner, Meyer,
Gonzalez-Vega, & Rodriguez-Meza, 2000; Schreiner, 2002). The
breadth of outreach reflects how many people the MFI serves,
reflecting its coverage in terms of the number of clients served.
The depth of outreach instead indicates whether an MFI serves
the poorest segments of the population (Brau & Woller, 2004;
Schreiner, 2002), generally measured by either the average loan
size scaled by the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of the
focal country or by the ratio of female to the total number of bor-
rowers. Unlike financial performance, which is relatively easy to
quantify using available, validated finance and accounting mea-
sures, debate continues about how best to measure social perfor-
mance. DÉspallier and Goedecke (2020) offer a survey discussion
and detail some disadvantages of standard outreach indicators;
in particular, outreach cannot be identical to social performance
and at best is a subdimension of a broad range of social perfor-mance indicators. Nor does outreach reflect the overall impact of
microfinance, which refers to the ultimate influence that financial
services have on people’s welfare. Greater outreach, implying that
the MFI has provided financial services to more people or propor-
tionally more to the poorest people, might lead to positive impacts
but does not do so inevitably. Even further, we cannot confirm that
average loan size, a commonly used measure of breadth, has any
relationship with poverty levels, because MFIs might cross-
subsidize expensive, small loans with profitable, larger loans,
which produces a higher average loan size (Armendáriz &
Szafarz, 2011). Alternatively, increased average loan sizes may
stem from demand-side factors related to the type of clients
(Morduch, 2000) or reflect a progressive lending system in which
credit limits increase over time, conditional on repayments of pre-
vious loans. Overall then, outreach indicators provide, at best, only
an imperfect indication of MFIs’ social performance.
Accordingly, empirical supply-side studies offer mixed results.
Some studies suggest a negative relationship between outreach
and financial sustainability (Cull et al., 2007; Hartarska, Shen, &
Mersland, 2013; Hermes et al., 2011; Louis & Baesens, 2013);
others find no trade-off (Adhikary & Papachristou, 2014; Louis,
Seret, & Baesens, 2013). A few studies propose that the likelihood
of a trade-off is contingent on factors such as the representation
of stakeholders on boards of MFIs (Hartarska, 2005), gender diver-
sity in the board (Hartarska, Nadolnyak, & Mersland, 2014), or loan
methodology (Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2012). Churchill (2019)
instead points to the type of outreach as an important contingency,
such that a trade-off may arise between financial sustainability and
depth, but complementarity marks the link between financial sus-
tainability and breadth. Churchill also shows that for-profit MFIs
outperform non-profit MFIs in terms of financial sustainability
and breadth of outreach, but not on the depth of outreach, which
reiterates the likely importance of organizational structure. Finally,
with a comprehensive meta-analysis of relevant literature,
Reichert (2018) simply concludes that there is no definitive answer
to the question of whether MFIs can achieve both goals
simultaneously.
2.3. Hypotheses development
Using insights from our review of prior literature, which relates
mainly to conventional MFIs, we seek to establish some predictions
regarding how conventional and Islamic MFIs might compare with
regard to the trade-off. We do not aim to derive new theory to
explain the differences between the two types of MFIs; rather,
we try to establish testable hypotheses.
With regard to social performance, we deliberately restrict our
predictions to differences in outreach, rather than social impact;
our research methodology (in line with prior supply-side studies)
cannot identify impact, which would require data from end-
users. Thus, the comparison focuses on the amount (breadth) and
type (depth) of borrowers served by the two types of institutions.
Both conventional and Islamic MFIs aim to provide financial access
to borrowers neglected by mainstream financial institutions (Cull
et al., 2007; Kleynjans & Hudon, 2016; Strøm, DÉspallier, &
Mersland, 2014). Among conventional MFIs, non-profit versions
still exist, though several developments make them less promi-
nent, as detailed by de Quidt et al. (2018a), including a broad shift
from non-profit to for-profit MFIs, increasing competition among
the growing numbers of MFIs in each country, and the enhanced
importance of individual lending at the expense of joint liability
group lending. According to Churchill (2019) findings, these three
trends seem likely to lead to greater breadth of outreach but
decreased depth among conventional MFIs. For example, rising
interest rates and heightened penalties for non-repayment
(Dehejia, Montgomery, & Morduch, 2012) imposed by for-profit
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from conventional MFIs. In contrast, Islamic MFIs explicitly inte-
grate a religious foundation for their operating principles, which
means they are barred from offering products that involve interest
(Abedifar et al., 2013) and also try to avoid high commissions or
fees (Beck, De Jonghe, & Schepens, 2013). Borrowers of Islamic
MFIs thus may be less likely to confront high borrowing costs or in-
voluntary exclusion. Moreover, borrowers who strictly adhere to
Islamic principles are de facto unable to borrow from conventional
MFIs, which do not adhere to Sharia. In this sense, conventional
MFIs may encounter more voluntary financial exclusion, which
may affect the breadth and depth of their outreach. The poorest
members of the population often adhere strictly to Sharia, due to
social and religious norms (El-Gamal, El-Komi, Karlan, & Osman,
2014), so we predict that voluntary exclusion may primarily affect
the depth of outreach, though this assertion is not clear ex ante.
More relevant for the breadth of outreach, Islamic MFIs are not
allowed to borrow from or lend to conventional MFIs, which may
induce liquidity problems (Weill, 2020). However, such limitations
on breadth also could be compensated for by expanded access to
other funding sources, such as Islamic charities and donations or
contributions from other borrowers. Therefore, we hypothesize
that Islamic MFIs perform, on average, better on outreach than
conventional MFIs, especially in terms of depth, whereas the out-
comes for breadth are less clear, due to liquidity concerns.
Turning to financial sustainability, we offer several reasons Isla-
mic MFIs may be likely to underperform financially relative to con-
ventional MFIs. First, their operational and administrative costs
likely are higher (El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013). Notably, Islamic MFIs
frequently offer non-PLS murabaha contracts, tied to some asset
(e.g., property, plant, equipment). The need to transfer such an
asset demands substantial operational costs, far more than manag-
ing a cash distribution. Murabaha also implies two sales transac-
tions instead of one, along with a higher sales price that
integrates a markup (and thus higher taxes). Furthermore, it
requires MFIs to store and insure the asset, with further increased
costs. Another popular product is qard e hasan (El-Zoghbi & Tarazi,
2013), which is easier to administer than murabaha but still is not
priced to cover all administrative and default costs. Second, even
the PLS contracts probably lead to more adverse selection and
moral hazard problems than interest-based contracts. Thus, for
the (relatively small) group of Islamic MFIs that adopt PLS
schemes, profits still may be lower than those earned by conven-
tional MFIs. The relatively high costs of providing Sharia-
compliant products may explain why the development of Islamic
microfinance has lagged; Islamic microfinance products still serve
less than 1 percent of borrowers (El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013). Noting
the generally higher operational costs and lower pricing of Islamic
financial products, relative to conventional microfinance, we
hypothesize that Islamic MFIs are less profitable than conventional
MFIs.8 In our data set of 101 Islamic MFIs, 89 were identified by our survey question;
Sanabel (2012) and the Islamic Banking Database (2014) helped us identify 12
additional Islamic MFIs that report to MIX Market.
9 We c a l c u l a t e t h e Mu s l im p opu l a t i o n f o r e a c h p e r i o d a s
PopulationFuture ¼ PopulationPresentx 1þ ið Þn , where i is the growth rate and n is the
number of years, which is 10 years for our study. For details, see Appendix B.1.
10 We cross-checked the information with data from the Organisation from Islamic
Corporation. Accessed from http://insct.syr.edu/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/OIC_
Member_States.pdf.
11 In contrast, Fan et al. (2019) only provide standard ordinary least square
regressions for comparing conventional and Islamic MFIs
12 Some MFIs that claim to be Islamic offer both Islamic and non-Islamic3. Data, model specification, and variables
3.1. Sample construction
To identify MFIs that offer Sharia-compliant products, we con-
ducted a web survey in 2016 (for more details, see Appendix A),
using invitation emails sent to key staff members of the 2,544 MFIs
that report to MIX Market.7 The survey contained questions about7 The MIX Market database provides information about a global set of registered
MFIs (www.mixmarket.com). Being listed indicates the MFI’s willingness to comply
with the data standards set by MIX Market, simply by the act of reporting data, yet
these data suffer from the well-known self-reporting biases.whether the MFI offered financial products in line with Islamic prin-
ciples, as well as the types of conventional and Islamic financial
products offered. We combined the results of our survey with infor-
mation gathered from two, more limited databases, namely, the
Sanabel (2012) and the Islamic Banking Database (2014).8 For con-
ventional MFIs, we also asked about plans to include Sharia-
compliant products in future portfolios.
We combine our global survey data (collected in 2016) with
existing (financial and outreach-related) information for the years
1999–2016, obtained from MIX Market. For some variables, we
also turned to other, existing data sources. Specifically, we obtain
country-level information about the percentage of the population
that is Muslim from Kettani (2010).9 For information about the offi-
cial state religion, we rely on a detailed report by Barro and McCleary
(2005), updated with other publicly available sources.10 We obtain
GDP data from the World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org). The final
sample of MFIs that completed our survey consists of 644 MFIs in 86
countries for the period 1999–2016, around 11% of which are Islamic
MFIs.3.2. Model specification
One of the main challenges of comparing outreach and financial
performance by Islamic versus conventional MFIs relates to endo-
geneity biases. That is, Islamic and conventional MFIs are not ran-
domly distributed over different countries, and some (probably the
most poor) Islamic borrowers are religiously prohibited from bor-
rowing from conventional MFIs. We thus cannot randomly assign
potential borrowers, who might borrow from both types of MFIs,
to either Islamic or conventional MFIs, and there is no clear-cut
solution to this endogeneity issue.
To address our central question, we apply both cross-sectional
and panel regressions, adopting several empirical approaches in
an attempt to mitigate endogeneity concerns.11 First, noting that
the main independent variable of interest (whether an MFI is Islamic,
ISMFI) is time-invariant, we start with two cross-sectional
approaches, using the between-subjects estimator and a Fama-
MacBeth regression.12 These regressions (as well as those detailed
subsequently) include approximately 10 additional independent
variables that allow us to control for selection based on observable
MFI characteristics (which we describe later in this section) to
assuage concerns about omitted variable bias. Second, we also use
a random-effects model and exploit the panel dimensions of our
data; we expect the estimates to be more efficient than in our
cross-sectional approach. Time dummies control for year effects.
Third, to address the endogeneity of the Islamic MFI variable, we
use an instrumental variables (IV) approach with two alternativemicrofinance products. We follow standard practice and classify MFIs as Islamic if
they offer both Islamic and non-Islamic microfinance products (e.g., Widiarto &
Emrouznejad, 2015). Their financial statements do not report the data for Islamic and
non-Islamic microfinance products separately, so it is not possible for us to
differentiate the contribution and role of Islamic versus non-Islamic products offered
by these MFIs.
13 The first-stage results for the other outreach and financial performances
indicators are very similar and can be obtained on request. Because our endogenous
variable ISMFI is time-invariant, we cannot use a first-difference generalized method
of moments (GMM) approach to identify ISMFI. In a system GMM approach, it would
be possible to include (and identify) ISMFI. However, the first difference of ISMFI
cannot be used as an instrument (it would disappear), so we cannot treat ISMFI as
endogenous variable according to a system GMM approach. The only solution thus is
to treat ISMFI as exogenous. Treating it as endogenous would require finding external
instruments, as in our IV regression methods. Therefore, we prefer to use our method
with external instruments, rather than GMM-based estimation techniques.
14 The weighted instrumental regressions are estimated without random effects
(normal OLS), because no available STATA programs can estimate weighted random
effects models with instruments. However, we cluster standard errors at the MFI
level. Because we are mainly interested in the coefficient for Islamic MFIs, this choice
does not change the main results.
15 In our survey, we directly asked about interest-free or Islamic microfinance
product offerings, which helped distinguish Islamic interest-free MFIs from non-
Islamic interest-free MFIs. We identified 230 interest-free MFIs, of which 129 are non-
Islamic and 101 are Islamic MFIs. The non-Islamic MFIs that provide interest-free
products are not considered Islamic for this analysis. The full questionnaire is
available on request.
16 This finding is not surprising: In Sudan, the entire financial sector is required to be
Sharia-compliant by national law. Whereas it hosted few MFIs in 2006, serving only
9500 clients, Sudan more recently supported over 400,000 customers via Islamic MFIs
(El-Zoghbi & Tarazi, 2013). Unlike in Sudan, both Islamic and conventional MFIs
operate in Pakistan. However, since 2007, the State Bank of Pakistan has increased
institutional support for Islamic microfinance.
6 S. Ahmad et al. /World Development 136 (2020) 105130instruments, though the choice of instruments (described subse-
quently) is limited by data availability. Fourth, we use an inverse
probability weighting (IPWIV) estimator to control for non-
response bias and non-random selection into the survey. The use
of different estimation techniques may enhance confidence in the
robustness of the results, though none of our identification strategies
can fully resolve endogeneity issues, so our results should be inter-
preted as correlational, not causal.
In all our empirical models, we regress the measures of out-
reach and financial performance by an MFI i in country j (at time
t, when we include the panel dimension), which we denote y on
a time-invariant dummy variable that equals 1 if the MFI in ques-
tion is Islamic, and 0 otherwise (ISMFIij), in addition to a series of
control variables, denoted by Z, that (may) vary across MFIs, coun-
try, and time. The precise definitions of the dependent variables
(outreach and financial performance) are in Table 4 and explained
in greater detail in Section 4.3.1.
Because our main independent variable ISMFIij is time-
invariant, we start with a cross-sectional regression, and our first
estimate uses a between-subject estimator, such that we run an
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on the group means (we
denote this specification GROUP MEANS), as follows:
yij





where yij denotes measures of either the outreach or financial per-
formance of an MFI i operating in country j; a0 is a constant; and eij
indicates mean-zero errors. In Eq. (1), all variables refer to means
across the period from 1999 to 2016.
Then we employ a second cross-sectional approach, with two-
step Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (FM). The first step esti-
mates the following cross-sectional regressions for each year in our
sample, from 1999 (period 1) to 2016 (period T), Eq. (2) :
yij;1 ¼ a0; 1 þ a1;1ISMFIij þ c1Zij;1 þ eij;1
yij;2 ¼ a0;2 þ a1;2ISMFIij þ c2Zij;2 þ eij;2
..
.
yij;T ¼ a0; T þ a1;T ISMFIij þ cTZij;T þ eij;T
; ð2Þ
where all variables are defined as previously. The second step takes
averages of the estimated a and c coefficients computed in the first
step and uses Fama and MacBeth (1973) adjusted t-statistics to test
for the significance of the coefficients.
In addition, we estimate the effect of interest using panel
regressions. For the time-invariant variable ISMFIij, we estimate a
random effects model with the following form, Eq. (3):
yij;t ¼ a0 þ a1ISMFIij þ cZij;t þ cij þ eij;t; ð3Þ
where cij is the individual unobserved (random) effect of MFI i in
country j, and eij;t is a mean-zero error term.
As we have argued, the Islamic MFI treatment variable is
likely endogenous, because MFIs choose to offer Islamic products.
Thus, we also use a random effects instrumental variable estima-
tor (REIV). We leverage the percentage of Muslims (PMP) and
whether Islam is a state religion (Islstate) in the country where
the MFI operates as instruments for ISMFI. These two variables
should correlate closely with the extent to which an MFI
operates in line with Islamic lending principles. Yet it is unlikely
that these variables influence the outreach or financial perfor-
mance of MFIs directly, other than through the ISMFI variable.
The first-stage results for the IV regression for the ‘‘Average LoanBalance per Borrower/GNI per Capita” are in Table C.1 in Appen-
dix C.13
Finally, the sample includes only those MFIs that responded to
our survey, so we use an inverse probability weighting estimator to
control for potential sample selection caused by non-responses
(Seaman & White, 2013). Briefly, this procedure works as follows:
We use a logit model to predict the probability that an MFI
responds to the survey, according to a set of independent variables
(year dummies, dummy variables for the legal status of the MFI,
the variables previously included in the Z vector; see Table C.2.1
in Appendix C). The inverse values of these predicted probabilities
then serve as weights in the subsequent regressions (of the deter-
minants of outreach and financial performance), such that observa-
tions with characteristics similar to those MFIs that did not
respond to our survey take higher weights. We report results for
which we combine the inverse probability weighting estimator
with the IV approach.14 (We also conducted these estimates without
instruments, and those results are available on request.)
4. Empirical results
This section presents the results of our empirical analyses. We
start by presenting summary statistics about the prevalence and
geographic distribution of Islamic MFIs, based on our newly con-
ducted survey. Then we offer new summary statistics regarding
the most common forms of financial contracts used by Islamic
MFIs. Finally, we present the regression results related to the
impact of Islamic versus conventional MFIs on outreach and finan-
cial sustainability.
4.1. Global expansion of Islamic microfinance: mapping exercise
The values reported in this subsection derive from Table 1. We
classify roughly 15.7% of the responding MFIs as Islamic: 101 MFIs
in 33 countries, spread across all world regions, report that they
offer Sharia-compliant products, whereas 543 MFIs exclusively
offer conventional products. Of the 543 conventional MFIs that
responded to our survey, 129 provide interest-free products, such
as grants and loans.15 Sudan (13 Islamic MFIs) and Pakistan (13 Isla-
mic MFIs) host the highest numbers of Islamic microfinance service
providers,16 followed by Bangladesh (9), Indonesia (7), and Palestine
(7). Table 1 also shows a rough estimate of the projected number of
Table 1
Worldwide Distribution of Islamic, Conventional, and Future Islamic MFIs.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia Latin America and the Caribbean South Asia East Asia and the Pacific Sub-Saharan Africa Middle East and North Africa
Countries No. of MFIs Countries No. of MFIs Countries No. of MFIs Countries No. of MFIs Countries No. of MFIs Countries No. of MFIs
ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs ISMFIs CMFIs FISMFIs
Albania 2 Argentina 2 Afghanistan 6 6 Cambodia 1 9 2 Benin 1 9 5 Bahrain 1 1
Armenia 3 Bolivia 10 Bangladesh 9 31 17 China 1 2 2 Burkina Faso 16 7 Egypt 2 2 3
Azerbaijan 5 4 Brazil 5 Bhutan 1 Indonesia 7 5 12 Burundi 3 Iraq 6 5 9
Bosnia and
Herzegovina
2 6 2 Chile 2 India 1 40 6 Laos 2 Cameroon 1 11 7 Jordan 2 1 3
Bulgaria 1 Colombia 19 1 Nepal 10 1 Malaysia 1 1 Central African
Republic
1 Lebanon 2 1 2
Croatia 1 Costa Rica 8 Pakistan 13 11 17 Myanmar 2 1 Congo, D.R. 6 2 Palestine 7 2 7
Georgia 4 Dominican
Republic
8 Sri Lanka 1 8 3 Guinea 2 1 Cote d’Ivoire 1 8 5 Saudi
Arabia
2 1 2
Kazakhstan 6 Ecuador 16 Philippines 2 16 4 Ethiopia 2 6 6 Syria 1 1 2
Kosovo 2 3 2 El Salvador 7 Vietnam 4 Gabon 1 1 Tunisia 1
Kyrgyzstan 1 10 4 Guatemala 11 1 Ghana 19 3 Yemen 6 6
Macedonia 1 Haiti 3 Guinea 1 1
Moldova 2 Honduras 16 Kenya 6 2
Mongolia 3 Mexico 1 9 1 Madagascar 4
Montenegro 2 Nicaragua 7 1 Malawi 7 1
Poland 2 Panama 3 Mali 8 1
Romania 3 Paraguay 2 Niger 1 4 3
Russia 8 Peru 1 14 1 Nigeria 1 13 1
Serbia 2 1 Uruguay 1 Rwanda 6
Tajikistan 9 5 Senegal 2 11 8
Uzbekistan 1 Sierra Leone 1
Somalia 1 1
South Africa 1





Total 5 74 18 2 143 5 30 101 50 12 42 14 23 169 74 29 14 35
Notes: This table shows the geographical distribution of Islamic, conventional, and future Islamic MFIs (denoted ISMFIs, CMFIs, and FISMFIs, respectively) across six global regions. To identify Islamic MFIs, we use three data
sources; the main source was the survey conducted in 2016, but the Sanabel (2012) and the Islamic Banking Database (2014) were also consulted. The identification of conventional MFIs comes from our survey. For the group of




























Comparing Islamic and conventional MFIs.
Islamic Conventional p-Value
Clients
Farmers 45.6 34.2 0.031
Salaried persons 12.3 17.2 0.25
Micro-entrepreneurs 40.9 53.5 0.043
Women 64.4 63.6 0.87
Clients below poverty line 45.2 43.4 0.78
Lending classification
Rural 69.1 60.7 0.14
Group 53.1 48.9 0.59
Sources of funds for MFIs
Donor agencies 48.2 33.8 0.13
Philanthropic donations 7.4 6.6 0.87
Charities 3.7 3.6 0.98
Government support 37 16.4 0.01
Waqf 3.7 4.4 0.86
Zakat Fund 7.4 0.4 <0.001
Notes: This table presents the difference between Islamic and conventional MFIs in
terms of targeted clients, lending classification, and sources of funds, according to
an equality of means test. Data come from our survey.
8 S. Ahmad et al. /World Development 136 (2020) 105130Islamic MFIs for our sample, calculated as a sum of the number of all
current Islamic MFIs plus all conventional MFIs that indicated they
intended to provide Islamic financial products in the future. These
projections show that the shares of MFIs offering Islamic microfi-
nance products are expected to grow across all regions (average of
1.3%), with the largest growth expected in Eastern Europe and Cen-
tral Asia (average of 2.3%).17
This data set also highlights the growth achieved already by
Islamic MFIs. Global market share (represented by financial rev-
enue) has increased from US$1 million in 1999 to US$325 million
in 2016, and the market size (represented by total assets) increased
from US$9 million to US$1,827 million in the same period.18 To put
such growth in perspective, we compare this market size with that of
the total assets of one big U.S. bank, JP Morgan Chase (2017): At the
end of December 2017, it amounted to more than US$2.5 trillion.
That is, on a global scale, the Islamic MFI sector is still small and con-
centrated, mostly in the Middle East. However, our survey results
suggest the number of Islamic MFIs (and conventional MFIs offering
Islamic products) will grow quickly, so this market share also is
likely to increase considerably in the near future.4.2. Characterization of the provision of Islamic financial products
Our survey results reveal some key features about the popular-
ity, clientele, and funding base of the different instruments. The
term ‘‘average” in this discussion refers to an average across MFIs.
First, equity instruments are relatively uncommon. As Table 2
shows,mudaraba andmusharaka products are issued19 by 17.2 per-
cent of Islamic MFIs, and an average of 22.6 percent of Islamic MFI
clients use these products.20 This preference might reflect the high
risk associated with equity products and the difficulties associated
with determining a project’s yield, which would imply the need
for costly monitoring. Instead, debt instruments, and murabaha
and qard e hasan in particular, are substantially more common than
equity instruments. In Table 2, 75.8 percent of Islamic MFIs provide
murabaha, 58.6 percent provide qard e hasan, and 20.7 percent pro-
vide sala’m products. On average, 47.6 percent of Islamic microfi-
nance clients use murabaha, 23.1 percent use qard e hasan, and
18.2 percent use sala’m. Thus, our results establish that Islamic MFIs
and their clients mainly rely on murabaha and qard e hasan.
Second, there are some notable similarities and differences
between Islamic and conventional MFIs, in terms of their clientele,
lending techniques, and funding sources. According to Table 3,17 For each region, we calculate the average shares of current Islamic MFIs and of
expected future Islamic MFIs. Then, the expected growth rate of the share of Islamic
MFIs per region is calculated as (average share of future Islamic MFIs – average share
of current Islamic MFIs)/average share of current Islamic MFIs.
18 For more information, please see contextual details in Appendix A.1.1.
19 We calculate the percentage of Islamic MFIs providing a certain Islamic financial
product as (number of Islamic MFIs offering a particular Islamic product/total number
of Islamic MFIs)  100.
20 We calculate the percentage of clients using Islamic products as (number of
clients using the offered product/total number of clients)  100 for each MFI that
offers a particular product. The values in the text represent simple averages of this
percentage, across all MFIs that offer the product.both types attract a predominantly female client base, such that
64.4 percent of Islamic MFI and 63.6 percent of conventional MFI
clients are female on average. On average, 17.2 percent of clients
of conventional MFIs are employed as salaried workers, compared
with 12.3 percent for Islamic MFIs, which aligns with the higher
average percentage of poor members in Islamic MFIs’ customer
bases (45.2% versus 43.4%). Neither of these differences is statisti-
cally significant though. Other differences appear more substantial,
such that 45.6 percent of Islamic MFIs’ client bases engage in farm-
ing, versus only 34.2 percent for conventional MFIs (p = .031). In
addition, 53.5 percent of conventional MFIs’ customer base
includes micro-entrepreneurs, compared with 40.9 percent for
Islamic MFIs (p = .043). Table 3 reveals no statistically significant
differences in terms of the MFIs’ reliance on rural lending, group
lending, or donor agencies, yet a significantly higher percentage
of Islamic MFIs report government support (37 percent) and Zakat
funds21 (7.4 percent) as main sources of funding.4.3. Regression results: outreach and financial sustainability
4.3.1. Data and descriptive statistics
Table 4 describes the variables used in the regression analyses
in detail. In particular, for our outreach dependent variable, we
include measures of both breadth (serving many people, even if
they are somewhat less poor) and depth (serving the poorest seg-
ments of the population) (Brau & Woller, 2004; Schreiner, 2002).
The measure of breadth of outreach uses the logarithm of the num-
ber of active borrowers (LNNAB) of MFI i operating in country j at
time t (Cull, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Morduch, 2009; Louis et al., 2013;
Mersland & Strøm, 2009); the measure of depth reflects the ratio
of the average loan size of MFI i at time t to the gross national
income per capita at time t (ALBGNI) of the country j in which it
operates. Greater depth implies smaller values of ALBGNI. Although
we note the ongoing discussion about the validity of the outreach
measures (see Section 2.2), more appropriate indicators have not
been established yet, so we maintain standard outreach indicators,
in line with prior literature (Cull et al., 2007; Fan et al., 2019;
Hermes et al., 2011; Mersland & Strøm, 2010; Quayes, 2012), even
while acknowledging that they can only give an indication of the21 Zakat is a charitable contribution, mandatory for Muslims who seek to satisfy
criteria related to their wealth.
Table 4
Variable definitions and sources.
Variable Abbreviation Definition
Main Variable of Interest
Islamic microfinance institution ISMFI Dummy variable, 1 if the MFI uses Islamic lending techniques; 0 otherwise. Source: Survey.
Country-Specific Variables
GDP growth GDPgrowth How fast the economy is growing, calculated by comparing one year of the country’s GDP to the
previous year. Source: http://data.worldbank.org
Instruments
Percent of Muslim population PMP Percentage of Muslims residing in the country. Source: Kettani (2010)
Islamic state Islstate Dummy variable equal to 1 if the official state religion of the country is Islam and 0 otherwise.
Source: Barro and McCleary (2005)
Dependent Variables
Log of number of active borrowers LNNAB Log number of entities with currently outstanding loan balances with the MFI or that are primarily
responsible for repaying any portion of the gross loan portfolio. Entities with multiple loans with an
MFI are counted as a single borrower.
Average loan balance per
borrower/GNI per capita
ALBGNI Average deposit balance per depositor, relative to local GNI per capita, which provides an estimate
of the coverage of the low-income population achieved through deposits. The indicator, calculated
in national currencies, is converted to U.S. dollars at official exchange rates to enable comparisons
across economies. To smooth fluctuations in prices and exchange rates, a special Atlas method of
conversion is used, as suggested the World Bank.
Return on assets ROA Measure of how well an MFI manages its assets to optimize its profitability. This ratio is net of
income taxes and excludes donations and non-operating items. It is calculated as net operating
income (less taxes) relative to average assets.
MFI-Specific Variables
Market share Mktshare Market concentration of an MFI in terms of earning revenue. We take the fraction of financial
revenue earned by an MFI in a given year with respect to total financial revenues in a given year
earned by all MFIs in the country.
Market size Mktsize Market size is proxied by the log of the assets, or the total value of resources controlled by MFI as a
result of past events, from which future economic benefits are expected to flow. For the calculation,
assets are the sum of each individual asset account listed.
Portfolio at risk >30 days PAR Portion of the loan portfolio ‘‘contaminated” by arrears and at risk of not being paid back. It
represents the outstanding balance in arrears over 30 days in addition to restructured loans,
divided by total outstanding gross portfolio.
Capital-to-assets ratio CAR Representing institutional solvency, it is calculated as total capital divided by risk-weighted assets.
Yield on gross loan portfolio YGLP Earning performance of an MFI, according to how effectively the MFI matches the maturities of its
assets and liabilities. It is calculated as financial revenue from the loan portfolio, divided by average
gross loan portfolio.
Gross loan portfolio-to-assets ratio GLP/assets The relation of an MFI’s loan portfolio to total assets, calculated as gross loan portfolio divided by
total assets.
Maturity in Age DumAge The length of duration since the MFI’s establishment. The dummy variable equals to 1 if the age of
an MFI is over 8 years and 0 otherwise.
Regulated DumReg Dummy variable equal to 1 if the MFI is regulated by some supervisory authority and 0 otherwise.
Notes: Unless otherwise noted, the source for these variables is MIX Market.
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the return on assets (ROA), or the ratio of net operating income to
total assets (Ahlin, Lin, & Maio, 2011; Armendáriz & Morduch,
2010; Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Servin et al., 2012; Strøm et al.,
2014),22 which varies across MFIs and time.
Table 5 provides the means, standard deviations, and ranges of
all the variables in our main regression, including the three depen-
dent variables. Foreshadowing our regression analysis, we list
these summary statistics separately for Islamic and conventional
MFI subsamples (i.e., for which we compare the conditional means
in our regression analysis). The log of the number of borrowers is
similar across Islamic and conventional MFIs, suggesting a similar
breadth of outreach. But the average loan balance per borrower
(scaled by gross national income per capita) is much smaller for
Islamic than for conventional MFIs (US$0.4 and 0.6, respectively),
so the depth of outreach appears higher for Islamic MFIs. In terms
of financial performance, Islamic MFIs underperform; their
mean ROA value is lower, equal to 0.6 percent, compared with22 In banking studies, it is common to use return on equity (ROE) to measure
financial performance, but in microfinance studies, it is more common to use ROA,
because ROE depends on the firm’s capital structure and equity. Our sample includes
non-profit MFIs, which lack equity capital for earnings purposes. As an advantage of
ROA, it evokes the same interpretation in all categories of MFIs, which facilitates
comparisons.0.9 percent for conventional MFIs. The purpose of our regression
analysis is to explore these differences in a more robust manner.
The regression analysis also includes a vector of the following
control variables: (1) market share, which reflects the market con-
centration of an MFI in terms of earning revenue (Mktshare); (2)
market size proxied by the log of assets (Mktsize), which is MFI-
and time-specific; (3) whether the portfolio at risk is greater than
30 days (PAR), which is MFI- and time-specific; (4) the capital-to-
assets ratio (CAR), which is MFI- and time-specific; (5) the yield
on the gross loan portfolio (YGLP); (6) the ratio of the gross loan
portfolio to assets (GLP/assets); (7) age (AgeDummy) as a dummy
variable, where 1 = mature MFI and 0 otherwise, which is MFI-
and time-specific; and (8) the regulatory status of the MFI
(RegDummy), another dummy variable, where 1 = MFI is regulated
and 0 otherwise, which is MFI-specific. We also include a country-
and time-specific control variable GDP growth (GDPgrowth) to cap-
ture general business cycle variation in the dependent variables in
our panel models. This variable, when used in our cross-sectional
specifications, controls for the average growth rate of a country
in the sample period. Finally, we include time dummies in the
panel regressions. As noted, the definitions, abbreviations, and
sources of the variables used in our regression analyses are in
Table 4. Then Table 5 shows that, with the exception of PAR
(clearly higher for Islamic MFIs), the control variables are similar
across the two groups of MFIs.
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Full sample (response = 1) Islamic MFIs Conventional MFIs
Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean SD Min. Max. Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
ALBGNI 5,045 0.61 1.27 0 30.67 491 0.43 0.47 0.01 3.35 4,554 0.63 1.33 0 30.67
LNNAB 5,086 9.47 1.90 2.49 15.92 499 9.55 1.92 4.58 14.06 4,587 9.46 1.90 2.49 15.92
ROA 4,407 0.01 0.13 3.45 1.01 414 0.01 0.15 1.45 0.26 3,993 0.01 0.13 3.45 1.01
Independent Variables
GDPgrowth 5,365 4.98 3.39 28.10 54.16 525 4.96 4.71 28.10 54.16 4,840 4.98 3.21 20.49 34.50
Mktshare 4,975 0.12 0.22 0.48 2.15 490 0.17 0.27 0.21 1 4,485 0.11 0.21 0.48 2.15
Mktsize 5,209 15.87 2.01 5.43 22.69 512 15.76 1.76 9.49 19.95 4,697 15.88 2.03 5.43 22.69
PAR 5,330 0.05 0.12 0 5.48 522 0.08 0.27 0 5.48 4,808 0.05 0.09 0 1.05
CAR 5,188 0.34 0.31 4.13 7.12 504 0.42 0.38 1.87 1 4,684 0.33 0.31 4.13 7.12
YGLP 5,312 0.24 0.25 1.33 11.48 520 0.24 0.54 0 11.48 4,792 0.23 0.20 1.33 1.52
GLP/assets 5,181 0.76 0.34 0 11.95 506 0.72 0.23 0 3.68 4,675 0.76 0.35 0 11.95
DumAge 5,366 0.69 0.46 0 1 526 0.60 0.49 0 1 4,840 0.70 0.46 0 1
DumReg 5,366 0.67 0.47 0 1 526 0.61 0.49 0 1 4,840 0.67 0.47 0 1
Instrumental Variables
PMP 5,366 33.86 39.64 0.01 99.98 526 73.20 32.61 0.01 99.98 4,840 29.58 37.95 0.01 99.77
Islstate 5,366 0.21 0.41 0 1 526 0.68 0.47 0 1 4,840 0.16 0.36 0 1
Notes: This table lists summary statistics for key variables for the full sample of respondents, Islamic MFIs, and conventional MFIs. Obs is the number of observations for each
variable; SD is standard deviation; and Min and Max are the minimum and maximum values for the variables, respectively.
Table 6
Regression results for outreach: ALBGNI.
Variables Group Means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects with IV Inverse Probability with IV
ISMFI 0.257* 0.225*** 0.276*** 1.212*** 1.120***
(0.132) (0.030) (0.103) (0.431) (0.329)
GDPgrowth 0.184 0.018 0.009** 0.010** 0.008
(0.137) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)
Mktshare 1.757*** 0.704*** 0.241** 0.153 0.704***
(0.667) (0.080) (0.120) (0.111) (0.253)
Mktsize 0.058 0.078*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.049**
(0.050) (0.011) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)
PAR 0.029 0.594 0.181 0.172** 0.156**
(0.872) (0.413) (0.115) (0.081) (0.077)
CAR 0.319 0.130*** 0.075 0.066 0.092
(0.234) (0.040) (0.080) (0.075) (0.130)
YGLP 0.001 0.642*** 0.230*** 0.181* 0.612***
(0.635) (0.114) (0.079) (0.094) (0.191)
GLP/assets 0.892* 0.420*** 0.028 0.017 0.204*
(0.467) (0.112) (0.048) (0.036) (0.110)
DumAge 0.111 0.151*** 0.009 0.024 0.188**
(0.174) (0.037) (0.044) (0.048) (0.089)
DumReg 0.270*** 0.298*** 0.400*** 0.383*** 0.293***
(0.104) (0.040) (0.144) (0.144) (0.070)
Constant 1.228 0.400* 0.742** 0.656** 0.457
(5.352) (0.215) (0.314) (0.278) (0.385)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,637
R-squared 0.177 0.137 0.037 0.029 0.035
Number of MFIID/ groups 571 18 571 571 563
Weak Identification Test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 29.30*** 13.49***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS size) 11.59 11.59
Overidentification Test of All Instruments
Hansen statistic 0.874 3.822
p-Value Hansen test 0.349 0.051
Notes: Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are based on a bootstrapping method; for Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV, the standard
errors are robust clustered standard errors (with MFI as the cluster). Group means refers to a between-subjects estimator (based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to
results using the Fama-MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with instruments panel
estimate; and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instruments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS bias critical values are
critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS bias (5% significance). The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case,
1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to ordinary least squares (in our case, 1%). The critical value
is obtained from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018); Stock and Yogo (2005) do not present relative bias tables for two instrumental variables. The Stock-Yogo TSLS size critical
values are critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS size (5% significance). The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in
our case, 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case, 15%) of a 5 percent Wald test where b = b0.
* Significant at 0.10%. ** Significant at 0.05%. *** Significant at 0.01%.
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We present the regression results in Table 6 (depth of outreach,
dependent variable AVLNGNI), Table 7 (breadth of outreach, depen-
dent variable LNNAB), and Table 8 (financial performance, depen-
dent variable ROA). In each table, we provide results obtained
with the five estimation methods we introduced previously (Group
means, FM, RE, REIV, and IPWIV). Supplementary regressions for
the first-stage are provided in Appendix C, Table C.1 and C2.
In Table 6, the coefficients for the Islamic MFI dummy variable
are negative and highly statistically significant in all specifications.
Therefore, and in line with our first hypothesis, Islamic MFIs
appear to exhibit greater depth of outreach than conventional MFIs,
controlling for macroeconomic growth, the size of the MFI proxied
by the log of assets (Mktsize), the age of the MFI, other relevant MFI
characteristics (e.g., market concentration), being regulated, and
time dummies. Most of the regression models show that MFIs with
greater market shares (Mktshare) and bigger, more regulated MFIs
(Mktsize and DumReg, respectively) offer less depth of outreach.
Somewhat surprisingly, older MFIs reveal greater depth. We also
note some indications that periods of higher GDP growth are asso-
ciated with less depth of outreach. Only the random-effects speci-
fications RE and REIV show significant results. Finally, the
coefficients for the portfolio at risk and capital-to-assets ratio are
mostly statistically insignificant in Table 6.Table 7
Regression Results for Outreach: LNNAB.























Time dummies Yes Yes
Observations 4,693 4,693
R-squared 0.629 0.619
Number of MFIID/ groups 571 18
Weak Identification Test
F-statistic of excluded instruments
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS bias)
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS size)
Overidentification Test of All Instruments
Hansen statistic
p-Value Hansen test
Notes: Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are based on a bootstrapping
errors are robust clustered standard errors (with MFI as the cluster). Group means refers
results using the Fama-MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects pane
estimate; and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse p
critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS bias (5% significance). The criti
1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired maximal bias of
is obtained from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018), Stock and Yogo (2005) do not present r
values are critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS size (5% significance)
our case, 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired max
* Significant at 0.10%. ** Significant at 0.05%. *** Significant at 0.01%.The coefficients for the Islamic MFI dummy variable in Table 7
are positive and highly statistically significant across almost all
regressions (cf. RE); Islamic MFIs exhibit greater breadth of out-
reach than conventional MFIs, ceteris paribus. Apparently, potential
liquidity problems created because Islamic MFIs cannot borrow
from conventional MFIs (see Section 2) do not restrict their breath
of outreach. Larger MFIs, measured by asset size, also indicate
greater breadth, which contrasts with the results for depth. But
in line with our depth results, we find that older MFIs indicate
greater breadth in most specifications. That is, older MFIs seem
to have greater outreach, in terms of both depth and breadth. Reg-
ulated MFIs, according to most specifications, exhibit less breadth
and depth. According to the coefficients on GDP growth in most
specifications, countries that grew faster on average in the sample
period also featured greater breadth of outreach. The portfolio at
risk and capital-to-assets ratio coefficients suggest that higher val-
ues are associated with less breadth, though not always
significantly.
The size of the coefficient for ISMFI is similar for the Group
means, FM, and RE estimates, which offers some reassurance
regarding the robustness of the results. However, the (absolute
value of the) coefficient for ISMFI is bigger for both IV estimates
(REIV and IPWIV). The relative magnitude of the estimates, and
































method; for Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV, the standard
to a between-subjects estimator (based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to
l estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with instruments panel
robability weighting and instruments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS bias critical values are
cal value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case,
the IV estimator relative to ordinary least squares (in our case, 1%). The critical value
elative bias tables for two instrumental variables. The Stock-Yogo TSLS size critical
. The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in
imal size (in our case, 15%) of a 5 percent Wald test where b = b0.
Table 8
Regression results for financial performance: ROA.
Variables Group Means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects with IV Inverse Probability with IV
ISMFI 0.013 0.022* 0.013 0.066 0.043
(0.025) (0.012) (0.020) (0.054) (0.036)
GDPgrowth 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mktshare 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.018
(0.023) (0.012) (0.036) (0.034) (0.019)
Mktsize 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.027*** 0.024*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
PAR 0.216 0.161*** 0.064 0.067* 0.009
(0.191) (0.038) (0.046) (0.039) (0.023)
CAR 0.097*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.088***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012)
YGLP 0.061 0.101 0.124*** 0.104** 0.018
(0.088) (0.060) (0.043) (0.044) (0.031)
GLP/assets 0.068*** 0.090*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.046***
(0.025) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)
DumAge 0.001 0.032*** 0.005 0.007 0.016*
(0.028) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
DumReg 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008)
Constant 0.188 0.276*** 0.426*** 0.379*** 0.180***
(0.276) (0.057) (0.084) (0.061) (0.059)
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,379 4,379 4,379 4,379 4,338
R-squared 0.142 0.215 0.065 0.092 0.083
Number of MFIID/ groups 563 18 563 563 556
Weak Identification Test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 27.36*** 12.47***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS size) 11.59 11.59
Overidentification Test of All Instruments
Hansen statistic 6.151 0.974
p-Value Hansen test 0.013 0.327
Notes: Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are based on a bootstrapping method; for Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV, the standard
errors are robust clustered standard errors (with MFI as the cluster). Group means refers to a between-subjects estimator (based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to
results using the Fama-MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with instruments panel
estimate; and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instruments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS bias critical values are
critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS bias (5% significance). The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case,
1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to ordinary least squares (in our case, 1%). The critical value
is obtained from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018); Stock and Yogo (2005) do not present relative bias tables for two instrumental variables. The Stock-Yogo TSLS size critical
values are critical values for the weak instrument test based on TSLS size (5% significance). The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in
our case, 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our case, 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case, 15%) of a 5 percent Wald test where b = b0. * Significant at 0.10%.
** Significant at 0.05%. *** Significant at 0.01%.
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implied by our OLS estimates, but this conclusion would be unwar-
ranted. In the OLS regression, the independent variable ISMFI is
binary (0, 1), but the IV procedure transforms it into a probability.
Because the probability of being an ISMFI is always less than 1, the
coefficient would need to be larger to produce the same effect size.
Therefore, the IV estimates in our case, where the endogenous vari-
able is a dummy, likely overestimate the actual effect size.23
Finally, Table 8 provides weak evidence in support of our sec-
ond hypothesis that Islamic MFIs financially underperform con-
ventional MFIs. The point estimate of the coefficient for IMFI is
negative for all regressions but statistically insignificant in almost
all cases. Apparently, the higher operational costs associated with
debt-like contracts (e.g., murabaha) and the potential for adverse23 In an effort to make IV and OLS estimates comparable, de Jong (2016) suggests
correcting the coefficient of the IV estimate by multiplying it by the mean value of the
first-step regression fitted values. In our case, we could approximate this value by
taking the percentage of Islamic MFIs in the data set (i.e., percentage of 1 values for
the endogenous dummy). When we do so, recalling that the percentage of Islamic
MFIs is about 11 percent, the coefficients of the IV estimates become comparable to
those of the OLS estimates.selection problems that arise when Islamic MFIs use PLS contracts
do not lead to significantly lower ROA. However, more research is
needed to explain the precise reasons for this outcome. Arguably, it
could arise because Islamic MFIs receive funding from donations.
In addition, in terms of control variables, larger MFIs and those
with higher capital-to-assets ratio display significantly higher ROA.
In summary, the results in Tables 6 and 7 strongly suggest that
outreach by Islamic MFIs is better than that by conventional MFIs,
in terms of both depth and breadth, so we confirm our first hypoth-
esis. However, Table 8 only provides weak evidence for our
hypothesis that Islamic MFIs underperform financially: The coeffi-
cient is negative but almost always insignificant.
As we noted in the previous section, two approaches (REIV and
IPWIV) use instruments to control for the possible endogeneity
bias.24 Valid (external) instruments must correlate with the endoge-
nous variable (ISMFI) but not the error term. Thus, appropriate exclu-24 Although the data for most of the control variables come from the Mix Market
data set, information about two instruments (percentage of Muslim population and
being an Islamic state) comes from other sources, which theoretically could introduce
a bias.
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come variables unless they go through ISMFI. We use the Hansen J
statistic tests for joint instrument validity to test the null hypothesis
that the instruments are valid and uncorrelated with the error term.
Lower p-values indicate stronger evidence that the instruments are
not valid, so rejecting the null hypothesis of the validity of the
instruments would need to be reconsidered. However, not rejecting
the null hypothesis does not mean the instruments are valid. We
also test for the failure of the relevance condition and weak instru-
ments. The first-stage F-statistic of the excluded instrument is, in
case of a single endogenous variable (as in our case), equal to the
Kleinbergen-Paap F statistic; we compare it with Stock and Yogo
(2005) critical values. According to the relevant IV test statistics in
Tables 6–8, for all models, the null hypothesis of weak instruments
is rejected, as also is true for small instrumental biases relative to
the OLS estimator and small IV sizes. Moreover, the Hansen J statistic
suggests that we cannot reject the null prediction of instrumental
validity for all but two specifications (ALBGNI in inverse probability
with IV and ROA in random effects with IV).4.3.3. Robustness checks
In addition to the regression results in Tables 6–8, we present
three sets of alternative regressions in Appendix D, see Table D1,
D.2.1, D.2.2, D.2.3, D.3.1, D.3.2, D.3.3, D.4.1, D.4.2 and D.4.3. First,
we consider a limited set of control variables, such that we exclude
time dummies. Second, we include a control variable for fees and
commission in another set of regressions, because Islamic MFIs
might charge fees.25 Controlling for fees in the estimates might be
relevant, because excluding them could bias financial performance
measures. Although we have limited information about these fees
and thus cannot control fully for this potential bias, MixMarket pub-
lishes, for a limited group ofMFIs, information about a variable it calls
‘‘Fee and commission income on loan portfolio,” which includes
‘‘penalties, commissions, and other fees earned on the loan portfolio,
other than penalty fees for late payment. It also includes revenues
under Islamic finance methods.‘‘ Therefore, we add this partial
control (see Table D.1) and provide the regression results in
Appendix D.26 Third, another set of regressions (Tables D.4.1 to
D.4.3) uses the binary dummy for Sharia-compliant MFIs as the main
independent variable; it identifies Islamic MFIs that only offer Islamic
microfinance products (whereas in the main analysis, we also
included Islamic MFIs that offer both conventional and Islamic
microfinance products). We thus can consider whether Islamic MFIs
offering conventional products differ from those offering only Islamic
products. In Appendix D, the three sets of additional regressions
provide results very similar to our main regressions, in support of
the robustness of our results.5. Conclusion
This study has pursued two main aims. First, we sought a
clearer picture of the global expansion and performance of Islamic
MFIs by offering, to the best of our knowledge, the first compre-
hensive mapping of their global presence. Second, we attempt to25 The service fee usually reflects the MFIs’ administrative costs, incurred during
loan disbursements. Generally, MFIs that provide qard e hasan (small, interest-free
loans) charge less than 1 percent as a one-time fee (Maazullah, 2017). Although
Islamic MFIs with equity-based contracts might charge higher fees, we lack detailed
information about this feature in our data set.
26 In addition, we have conducted estimates, for which, following Dorfleitner, Leidl,
Priberny, and von Mosch (2013), we added a lending rate LR of MFIs calculated
as;LR ¼ IncomeGLPð1WORÞ þ FeesGLP where Income is interest/profit rate, Yield is yield on gross
portfolio, GLP is gross loan portfolio, fees is fee and commission earned and WOR is
the write-off ratio. The results are similar to the main results and can be obtained on
request.provide a comparative analysis of their performance, relative to
that of conventional MFIs.
The mapping exercise identifies 101 institutions in 33 countries
offering Sharia-compliant microfinance services. South Asia
accounts for the largest number of Islamic MFIs, with 30 (13 in
Pakistan, 9 in Bangladesh). The Middle East and North Africa also
feature many Islamic MFIs, with 29 providers, and sub-Saharan
Africa accounts for 23 Islamic MFIs. In terms of the availability of
different types of Islamic financial products, murabaha, a debt-
based financing product, is the most widespread, and 64.7 percent
of Islamic MFIs in our sample provide it. Due to the high risk asso-
ciated with equity-based products such as musharaka, they are
offered by relatively fewer MFIs.
When we test whether Islamic MFIs are better able to reach the
socially oriented goal of increased outreach, in line with our pre-
dictions, we find that Islamic MFIs perform better. In particular,
they serve more and poorer borrowers. In terms of financial results,
we find some weak evidence that Islamic MFIs underperform con-
ventional MFIs, though in most cases, the differences are not statis-
tically significant.
Some caveats must be noted. The results clearly indicate that
Islamic MFIs perform better in terms of outreach, but we reiterate
the caution that we cannot address all the potential endogeneity
issues. As a limitation of our analysis, we also cannot identify
whether the positive results reflect differences in the production
function between the two types of MFIs or differences in the clien-
tele. In other words, we are not able to robustly identify whether
the increase in outreach is due to involuntary or voluntary financial
exclusion. Islamic clients, for religious reasons, may refuse to deal
with conventional MFIs, so our results could be partly explained by
demand effects and voluntary exclusion. Yet several studies assert
that Muslim consumers are not solely interested in Islamic
finance—Dar (2004) claims that that only 5 percent of U.K. Muslims
seek Islamic financial services—so we reason that our results are
more likely to be (mainly) explained by differences in production
functions. Still, this conclusion requires caution, and our results
should be interpreted as robust correlations rather than evidence
of causality. We hope these findings in turn prompt continued
comparative studies of the performance of Islamic and conven-
tional MFIs along other dimensions, as well as studies that delve
deeper into the reasons for their varying social performance.CRediT authorship contribution statement
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A.1. Constructing the dataset
We construct our dataset by combining our online survey with
the existing data sources and published reports. Below, we provide
a detailed description of the data sources which are employed in
our study.27 We also compared the projections provided in the Kettani dataset with that of
Pew Research Center dataset for 2010 and 2020. The correlation between the two
datasets was extremely high (correlation coefficient is 0.998), so we don’t have any
reason to believe that the use of the Kettani dataset would bias our results.A.1.2. Details for online survey
– Survey format and implementation: For receiving maximum
responses we designed a short survey that can be completed
within 5 min on average. For achieving this, we had to make a
choice between amassing detailed information from Islamic
microfinance institutions or gathering a more general informa-
tion from both Islamic and non-Islamic microfinance institu-
tions. To make the most use of a short survey, we collect
information from both Islamic and non-Islamic microfinance
institutions, about the indicators which are not available at
MIX market database.
We organized our survey into three key sections: (1) identifica-
tion of Islamic microfinance service providers; (2) provision of
Islamic microfinance products; and (3) information about clien-
tele, lending methodologies and sources of funding. We organized
the questions in an order so that the information was first col-
lected on the type of financial products offered i.e., interest-
based, interest-free or both types. Following the response, we
then asked specific questions each related to adherence with the
Islamic principles or future plans of providing Islamic financial
products.
With responses to Section 1, we identify those MFIs who at pre-
sent provide microfinance products in line with Islamic principles
as well as those MFIs who plan to provide such products in the
future. Additionally, we identify those non-Islamic MFIs that are
providing interest-free microfinance products. Section 2 was
answered by Islamic MFIs only because we used skip and display
logic in our survey design. Subject to the completion of the survey,
Section 3 was filled by all responding MFIs.
– Data collection mode: We administered our online survey
through Qualtrics; a web service used for conducting online
surveys. We programmed Qualtrics to display one survey ques-
tion at a time allowing the direct entry of the responses, while
employing the display and skip logic checks. It also facilitates a
user friendly survey design so that the survey can be accessed
via mobile phone by the respondent. For quality controls and
to avoid multiple responses by the same respondent, the system
assigns only one specified web-link to each respondent email ID
for survey participation. After the survey completion, the data
can be downloaded from the server in a format compatible for
analysis.
– Contextual details: Following details are for the calendar year
2016 that is the period when the online survey identifying
Islamic MFIs is conducted. In our data, most of the Islamic
MFIs are found to be not-profit MFIs. Concerning the market
size in our data, total assets for non-profit Islamic MFIs are
1337 Million and for profit Islamic MFIs are149 Million. In
terms of Active Borrowers, the end of the year 2016 shows
non-profit Islamic MFIs to be the largest provider with over
4 Million clients and a market share of 296 Million. The
share of non-profit Islamic microfinance segment remained
stagnant at 3 Million in terms of number of depositors from
2015 to 2016. A quick highlight is provided in Table A.1.1
below.Table A.1.1




(in Millions)Market size 1337 149
Market share 296 26
Gross Loan portfolio 1113 82
Number of borrowers 4 0.085
Number of depositors 3 0.285Notes: The table represents the data for Islamic MFIs in 2016 and
the values are presented in Million. Total assets are taken for repre-
senting market size; financial revenue is taken for representing
market share. Data source: Author’s survey and MIX market data.A.1.2. Existing databases
MIX Market database: For MFI-level variables, we use the data
(financial and social indicators) on the MFIs, provided by MIX
Market.
World Bank: For country-level variables, we collected data from
World Bank database and it includes information about country’s
growth.
A.1.3. Published reports
We consulted some published reports for constructing our
instrumental variables, Kettani (2010) and Barro and McCleary
(2005).
Appendix B. Variable’s information/details
B.1. Percentage of Muslim population (PMP)
We use the data from Kettani (2010) because this is the only
reference available that provides data covering the entire period
of our study. Kettani provides the percentage of Muslims’ popula-
tion by using official census and reliable national sources of data.
The only other available dataset is the Pew Research Center
dataset (2015) which is based on the data from the study con-
ducted in 2009–2010. This source provides data for the last period
(i.e., 2010 and 2020), but not for earlier period of our study. In
order to avoid using two datasets for the same variable we pre-
ferred using the Kettani dataset for the entire period.27
Both available datasets use official census as the primary source
for attaining percentage of Muslims which, for any country the offi-
cial population census, is after every ten years. Thus, both of the
available datasets have a time lapse of ten years. There is another
caveat about Pew’s report that it does not provide information
about the growth rate of Muslims making it impossible for achiev-
ing the yearly percentage of the Muslim population. While Kettani
documents annual population growth rate (APGR) which we
employ to estimate the yearly percent of Muslims.
Since our study period is 1999–2016, we project the estimate
for each year as PopulationFuture ¼ PopulationPresentx 1þ ið Þn, where i
is the growth rate and n is the number of years, which is 10 years
for our study.
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Table C.1
Average Loan Balance per borrower per GNI (Instrumental random
effects).ISMFI Coeff. Robust Std. Err. t P > tGDPgrowth 0.0002 0.0001 1.3 0.194
Mkrshare 0.014 0.005 2.59 0.010
Mktsize 0.001 0.002 0.69 0.491
PAR 0.003 0.002 1.22 0.224
CAR 0.003 0.004 0.8 0.424
YGLP 0.015 0.012 1.25 0.213
GLP/assets 0.000 0.001 0.01 0.992
DumAge 0.003 0.002 2.08 0.037
DumReg 0.010 0.027 0.35 0.723
PMP 0.001 0.001 1.68 0.094
Islstate 0.238 0.062 3.86 0.000
Constant 0.028 0.026 1.07 0.285
Year Dummies Yes
Observations 4,680Notes: This table presents first stage results for instrumental
random effects, where Coeff represents coefficient estimates, Std.
Err shows the standard error term, and t represents t-statistics.
ISMFI (a dummy variable which is 1 when an MFI provides Islamic
financial products/services and 0 when it provides conventional
financial products whether or not it charges interest rate from
the clients) is the dependent variable for the first stage. GDPgrowth
measures how fast the economy is growing and is calculated by
comparing one year of the country’s GDP to the previous year.Mkt-
share is the fraction of financial revenue earned by an MFI in a
given year with respect to total financial revenues in a given year
earned by all MFIs in the country. Mktsize is the log of total assets.
PAR is portfolio at risk and is that portion of loan portfolio which is
‘‘contaminated” by arrears and is at the risk of not being paid back
to MFI. CAR is capital to assets ratio representing the institutional
solvency and is calculated as total capital divided by risk weighted
assets. YGLP represents financial revenue from loan portfolio
divided by average gross loan portfolio. GLP/assets measure the
relation of an MFI’s loan portfolio to the total assets. DumAge is a
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the age of an MFI is over 8
years; 0 otherwise. DumReg is a dummy variable identifying an
MFI as 1 if it is regulated by some supervisory authority; 0 other-
wise. PMP is the percent of Muslim population in a country where
MFI is located. Islstate is 1 if the state religion of the country is
Islam; 0 otherwise.
C.2. Weighted instrumental regressions
C.2.1. Logistic regression for weighting the variables (inverse




2000 0.023 0.253 0.090 0.928 0.473 0.519
2001 0.055 0.237 0.230 0.817 0.520 0.410
2002 0.224 0.226 0.990 0.320 0.667 0.218
2003 0.416 0.220 1.900 0.058 0.847 0.014
2004 0.389 0.217 1.790 0.074 0.815 0.037
2005 0.418 0.216 1.940 0.053 0.841 0.005
2006 0.417 0.216 1.930 0.054 0.841 0.007C.2.1 (continued)Response Coeff. Std.
Err.z P>z [95%
Conf.
Interval]2007 0.418 0.218 1.920 0.055 0.844 0.009
2008 0.428 0.218 1.960 0.050 0.855 0.001
2009 0.373 0.218 1.710 0.087 0.800 0.054
2010 0.350 0.218 1.610 0.108 0.777 0.077
2011 0.314 0.218 1.440 0.150 0.741 0.113
2012 0.269 0.220 1.220 0.221 0.700 0.162
2013 0.234 0.221 1.060 0.290 0.667 0.200
2014 0.166 0.220 0.750 0.450 0.597 0.265
2015 0.216 0.222 0.970 0.330 0.650 0.218
2016 0.145 0.225 0.640 0.521 0.587 0.297
Legal status of MFIs
CU 0.264 0.098 2.690 0.007 0.071 0.456
NBFI 0.288 0.081 3.540 0.000 0.128 0.447
NGO 0.791 0.094 8.420 0.000 0.607 0.975
Other 0.610 0.190 3.220 0.001 0.238 0.981
Rural Bank 0.579 0.152 3.820 0.000 0.876 0.282
GDPgrowth 0.0004 0.007 0.060 0.955 0.014 0.015
Mktshare 0.759 0.148 5.140 0.000 0.470 1.049
Mktsize 0.093 0.014 6.520 0.000 0.065 0.122
PAR 0.399 0.193 2.070 0.038 0.777 0.022
CAR 0.119 0.071 1.690 0.092 0.019 0.258
YGLP 0.855 0.115 7.440 0.000 0.630 1.080
GLP/assets 0.015 0.012 1.250 0.211 0.039 0.009
DumAge 0.014 0.050 0.270 0.786 0.084 0.111
DumReg 0.439 0.059 7.450 0.000 0.323 0.554




3180.13Pseudo R2 0.165Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy, equal to 1 if the MFI
returned the questionnaire. Coeff represents coefficient estimates,
Std. Err shows the standard error term, and z represents z-
statistics. As independent variables, we use dummies for the fiscal
year. Legal status of the MFIs include; Bank is dummy variable iden-
tifying anMFI as 1 if statuary status is bank; 0 otherwise, CU is credit
union/cooperative and is a dummy variable identifying anMFI as 1 if
statuary status is a credit union or a cooperative; 0 otherwise,NBFI is
Non-Banking Financial Intermediary and dummy variable identify-
ing an MFI as 1 if statuary status is a credit union or a cooperative;
0 otherwise, NGO is non-governmental organization and is a dummy
variable identifying an MFI as 1 if statuary status is non-
governmental organization; 0 otherwise and Other is a dummy vari-
able identifying an MFI as 1 if statuary status is other; 0 otherwise.
GDPgrowthmeasures how fast the economy is growing and is calcu-
lated by comparing one year of the country’s GDP to the previous
year. Mktshare is the fraction of financial revenue earned by an
MFI in a given year with respect to total financial revenues in a given
year earned by all MFIs in the country. Mktsize is the log of total
assets. PAR is portfolio at risk and is that portion of loan portfolio
which is ‘‘contaminated” by arrears and is at the risk of not being
paid back to MFI. CAR is capital to assets ratio representing the insti-
tutional solvency and is calculated as total capital divided by risk
weighted assets. YGLP represents financial revenue from loan portfo-
lio divided by average gross loan portfolio. GLP/assets measure the
relation of an MFI’s loan portfolio to the total assets. DumAge is a
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the age of an MFI is over 8 years;
0 otherwise.DumReg is a dummy variable identifying anMFI as 1 if it
is regulated by some supervisory authority; 0 otherwise.
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Average Loan Balance per GNI (Inverse Probability with Instru-
mental variables).ISMFI Coeff. Robust Std. Err. t P > tGDPgrowth 0.0004 0.002 0.180 0.860
Mkrshare 0.101 0.058 1.730 0.083
Mktsize 0.009 0.006 1.410 0.158
PAR 0.138 0.027 5.080 0.000
CAR 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.999
YGLP 0.001 0.044 0.020 0.986
GLP/assets 0.010 0.009 1.130 0.260
DumAge 0.042 0.017 2.400 0.017
DumReg 0.004 0.028 0.150 0.879
PMP 0.0001 0.0004 0.280 0.781
Islstate 0.312 0.067 4.680 0.000
Constant 0.116 0.098 1.190 0.236
Year Dummies Yes
Observations 4,637Notes: This table presents first stage results for instrumental ran-
dom effects, where Coeff represents coefficient estimates, Std. Errshows the standard error term, and t represents t-statistics. ISMFI
(a dummy variable which is 1 when an MFI provides Islamic finan-
cial products/services and 0 when it provides conventional financial
products whether or not it charges interest rate from the clients) is
the dependent variable for the first stage. GDPgrowthmeasures how
fast the economy is growing and is calculated by comparing one
year of the country’s GDP to the previous year. Mktshare is the frac-
tion of financial revenue earned by an MFI in a given year with
respect to total financial revenues in a given year earned by all MFIs
in the country. Mktsize is the log of total assets. PAR is portfolio at
risk and is that portion of loan portfolio which is ‘‘contaminated”
by arrears and is at the risk of not being paid back to MFI. CAR is
capital to assets ratio representing the institutional solvency and
is calculated as total capital divided by risk weighted assets. YGLP
represents financial revenue from loan portfolio divided by average
gross loan portfolio. GLP/assetsmeasure the relation of an MFI’s loan
portfolio to the total assets. DumAge is a dummy variable that
equals to 1 if the age of an MFI is over 8 years; 0 otherwise. DumReg
is a dummy variable identifying an MFI as 1 if it is regulated by
some supervisory authority; 0 otherwise. PMP is the percent of
Muslim population in a country where MFI is located. Islstate is 1
if the state religion of the country is Islam; 0 otherwise.Appendix D. Robustness checks.
Table D1
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics.Variable name Definition N Mean SDFees and commission
earned (Fees)Fees and commission earned by an MFI refers to penalties, commissions, and other
fees earned on the loan portfolio, excluding penalty fees for late payment. Under
Islamic finance methods, this may also include revenues earned by an MFI.3,519 7,82,187 3,008,610Sharia compliant Sharia compliant is a binary variable and indicates Islamic MFIs that only offer
Islamic microfinance products.5,366 0.041 0.198Notes: This table reports variable definitions, number of observations (N), means and standard deviations (Std. Dev.) of the dependent vari-
ables used for data quality estimates. For fees, the data is taken from MIX Market and Sharia compliant stems from the authors’ survey.
D.2. Results with smaller set of controls
Table D.2.1
Regression results for outreach: ALBGNI.Variables Group Means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.317*** 0.150*** 0.333*** 1.226*** 0.949***
(0.108) (0.034) (0.107) (0.416) (0.306)GDPgrowth 0.130 0.014 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.010
(0.130) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004) (0.010)Mktsize 0.167*** 0.112*** 0.043** 0.049** 0.078***
(0.065) (0.011) (0.021) (0.020) (0.022)PAR 0.979 0.811 0.179* 0.169** 0.144
(0.733) (0.479) (0.100) (0.079) (0.099)CAR 0.331* 0.087*** 0.072 0.066 0.055
(0.198) (0.026) (0.074) (0.066) (0.116)DumAge 0.379* 0.190*** 0.050 0.068 0.193**
(0.204) (0.045) (0.043) (0.045) (0.089)DumReg 0.301* 0.309*** 0.424*** 0.406*** 0.335***
(0.179) (0.035) (0.156) (0.139) (0.071)Constant 2.368* 1.297*** 0.193 0.176 0.692**
(1.318) (0.175) (0.317) (0.285) (0.335)
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with IVInverse Probability
with IVObservations 4,894 4,894 4,894 4,894 4,848
R-squared 0.064 0.095 0.036 0.018 0.022
Number of MFIID/ groups 584 18 584 584 576Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 30.29*** 13.58***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 0.683 5.204
P-value Hansen test 0.409 0.023Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group Means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group Means refers to a between estimator (results based on group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
Table D.2.2
Regression results for outreach: LNNABVariables Group Means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.357** 0.280*** 0.144 2.454*** 2.883***
(0.142) (0.079) (0.159) (0.566) (0.790)GDPgrowth 0.154*** 0.066*** 0.001 0.001 0.054***
(0.036) (0.014) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015)Mktsize 0.704*** 0.681*** 0.689*** 0.688*** 0.766***
(0.037) (0.029) (0.021) (0.021) (0.033)PAR 1.892*** 1.604*** 0.076 0.077 0.537**
(0.598) (0.303) (0.141) (0.115) (0.258)CAR 0.359* 0.442*** 0.059 0.060 0.334
(0.198) (0.076) (0.099) (0.105) (0.232)DumAge 0.751*** 0.477*** 0.056 0.058 0.320**
(0.141) (0.104) (0.047) (0.045) (0.130)DumReg 0.218** 0.104* 0.227** 0.201 0.160
(0.104) (0.050) (0.098) (0.123) (0.147)Constant 2.769*** 1.628*** 1.508*** 1.779*** 3.288***
(0.593) (0.436) (0.325) (0.319) (0.531)Observations 4,914 4,914 4,914 4,914 4,868
R-squared 0.607 0.606 0.588 0.472 0.504
Number of MFIID/ groups 585 18 585 585 577Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 30.48*** 13.68***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 0.421 0.957
P-value Hansen test 0.516 0.328
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based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group Means refers to a between estimator (results based on group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
Table D.2.3
Regression results for Financial Performance: ROA.Variables Group Means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.016 0.027** 0.021 0.092* 0.054
(0.024) (0.012) (0.021) (0.054) (0.038)GDPgrowth 0.002 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.002*
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)Mktsize 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.008***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)PAR 0.254 0.152*** 0.074 0.075* 0.014
(0.171) (0.033) (0.052) (0.043) (0.025)CAR 0.086*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.092***
(0.030) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.011)DumAge 0.026 0.029*** 0.001 0.003 0.015**
(0.019) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)DumReg 0.025* 0.005 0.015 0.014 0.011
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.009)Constant 0.237*** 0.200*** 0.325*** 0.305*** 0.165***
(0.073) (0.052) (0.055) (0.053) (0.040)Observations 4,390 4,390 4,390 4,390 4,349
R-squared 0.077 0.163 0.061 0.049 0.050
Number of MFIID/ groups 563 18 563 563 556Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 27.57*** 12.45***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 2.684 0.326
P-value Hansen test 0.101 0.568Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group Means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group Means refers to a between estimator (results based on group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
S. Ahmad et al. /World Development 136 (2020) 105130 19D.3. Results after adding fees and commission on loans
Table D.3.1
Regression results for outreach: ALBGNIVariables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.242** 0.217*** 0.176** 1.024*** 1.056***
(0.117) (0.026) (0.079) (0.294) (0.315)GDPgrowth 0.027 0.018 0.005 0.005 0.003
(0.024) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)Fees 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Mktshare 1.566** 0.769*** 0.164 0.056 0.950***
(0.628) (0.120) (0.163) (0.175) (0.316)Mktsize 0.034 0.081*** 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.058**
(0.043) (0.009) (0.023) (0.020) (0.025)PAR 0.439 0.223* 0.432*** 0.399*** 0.280
(0.823) (0.118) (0.128) (0.121) (0.199)CAR 0.366* 0.080 0.061 0.052 0.035
(0.219) (0.048) (0.073) (0.060) (0.129)YGLP 0.084 0.536*** 0.144 0.099 0.443**
(0.540) (0.143) (0.111) (0.101) (0.180)GLP/assets 0.296 0.300** 0.004 0.013 0.274**
(0.247) (0.111) (0.068) (0.053) (0.111)DumAge 0.109 0.151*** 0.056 0.074 0.236***
(0.138) (0.041) (0.052) (0.056) (0.085)DumReg 0.156 0.197*** 0.205 0.197 0.231***
(0.128) (0.032) (0.146) (0.134) (0.072)Constant 0.092 0.480* 1.119*** 0.945*** 0.062
(0.807) (0.232) (0.341) (0.303) (0.421)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,348 3,348 3,348 3,348 3,324
R-squared 0.197 0.153 0.052 0.027 0.067
Number of MFIID/ groups 522 14 522 522 516Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 28.68*** 13.84***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 5.663 5.079
P-value Hansen test 0.017 0.024Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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Regression results for outreach: LNNABVariables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.317** 0.423*** 0.095 2.300*** 3.025***
(0.162) (0.066) (0.165) (0.522) (0.745)GDPgrowth 0.163*** 0.064*** 0.008** 0.008** 0.067***
(0.031) (0.019) (0.003) (0.003) (0.019)Fees 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Mktshare 0.592 0.456*** 0.351*** 0.334*** 0.587
(0.423) (0.123) (0.111) (0.097) (0.443)Mktsize 0.826*** 0.762*** 0.731*** 0.732*** 0.859***
(0.047) (0.021) (0.028) (0.029) (0.047)PAR 1.183* 1.249*** 0.026 0.026 0.743*
(0.693) (0.212) (0.149) (0.148) (0.447)CAR 0.192 0.520*** 0.134 0.136* 0.449*
(0.296) (0.077) (0.088) (0.079) (0.266)YGLP 0.223 0.848*** 0.298** 0.271** 0.830**
(0.582) (0.177) (0.128) (0.133) (0.365)GLP/assets 0.469** 0.400** 0.598*** 0.599*** 0.843***
(0.237) (0.139) (0.116) (0.088) (0.135)DumAge 0.453*** 0.235*** 0.055 0.061 0.319**
(0.141) (0.073) (0.043) (0.042) (0.155)DumReg 0.270** 0.119*** 0.188* 0.156 0.121
(0.108) (0.026) (0.101) (0.127) (0.154)Constant 4.762*** 3.341*** 2.793*** 3.085*** 5.925***
(0.946) (0.400) (0.484) (0.483) (0.839)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,355 3,355 3,355 3,355 3,331
R-squared 0.668 0.630 0.590 0.754 0.515
Number of MFIID/ groups 522 14 522 522 516Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 29.27*** 13.93***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 0.027 0.605
P-value Hansen test 0.869 0.437Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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Regression results for financial performance: ROAVariables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVISMFI 0.013 0.003 0.000 0.058 0.034
(0.020) (0.008) (0.022) (0.053) (0.034)GDPgrowth 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)Fees 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)Mktshare 0.009 0.019 0.043 0.043 0.031*
(0.023) (0.011) (0.045) (0.045) (0.017)Mktsize 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.035*** 0.030*** 0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)PAR 0.332 0.159*** 0.157*** 0.162*** 0.128***
(0.202) (0.023) (0.032) (0.033) (0.036)CAR 0.102*** 0.099*** 0.074** 0.077** 0.101***
(0.023) (0.020) (0.036) (0.031) (0.013)YGLP 0.067 0.032 0.175** 0.144* 0.021
(0.099) (0.034) (0.075) (0.077) (0.042)GLP/assets 0.067** 0.087*** 0.027 0.026** 0.028***
(0.027) (0.016) (0.017) (0.012) (0.010)DumAge 0.024 0.019*** 0.000 0.002 0.018*
(0.033) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010)DumReg 0.020 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.009
(0.013) (0.004) (0.017) (0.016) (0.009)Constant 0.276*** 0.355*** 0.657*** 0.573*** 0.239***
(0.092) (0.055) (0.123) (0.090) (0.039)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 3,228 3,228 3,228 3,228 3,203
R-squared 0.164 0.281 0.074 0.135 0.098
Number of MFIID/ groups 516 14 516 516 511Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 27.90*** 12.75***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 11.57
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 11.59 11.59Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 2.535 0.060
P-value Hansen test 0.111 0.807Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in our case 1%). The critical value is obtained from Skeels and
Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only for 3 or more
instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Size: Signif-
icance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumen-
tal variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 15%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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Table D.4.1
Regression results for outreach: ALBGNI.Variables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVSharia compliant 0.107 0.107** 0.124 1.697*** 1.363***
(0.237) (0.045) (0.121) (0.637) (0.465)GDPgrowth 0.184 0.017 0.009** 0.010** 0.006
(0.138) (0.010) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011)Mktshare 1.721** 0.689*** 0.242** 0.152 0.679***
(0.675) (0.079) (0.120) (0.111) (0.245)Mktsize 0.058 0.076*** 0.084*** 0.081*** 0.044*
(0.051) (0.011) (0.023) (0.020) (0.023)PAR 0.021 0.557 0.181 0.175** 0.187**
(0.867) (0.417) (0.115) (0.082) (0.083)CAR 0.339 0.157*** 0.075 0.059 0.148
(0.232) (0.037) (0.079) (0.074) (0.132)YGLP 0.013 0.619*** 0.231*** 0.164* 0.544***
(0.607) (0.111) (0.078) (0.098) (0.175)GLP/assets 0.885* 0.403*** 0.028 0.017 0.194*
(0.466) (0.113) (0.048) (0.036) (0.107)DumAge 0.099 0.147*** 0.009 0.026 0.198**
(0.175) (0.038) (0.044) (0.048) (0.089)DumReg 0.271*** 0.301*** 0.401*** 0.364** 0.276***
(0.104) (0.039) (0.145) (0.145) (0.069)Constant 1.317 0.393* 0.766** 0.633** 0.364
(5.328) (0.212) (0.314) (0.278) (0.383)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,680 4,637
R-squared 0.175 0.134 0.036 0.026 0.038
Number of MFIID/ groups 571 18 571 571 563Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 20.88*** 9.96***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 9.02
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 8.75 8.75Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 0.984 4.269
P-value Hansen test 0.321 0.039Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in this case 1% and 5%, respectively). The critical value is obtained
from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only
for 3 or more instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS
Size: Significance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of
instrumental variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 20%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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Regression results for outreach: LNNAB.Variables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVSharia compliant 0.459** 0.264*** 0.033 3.827*** 4.115***
(0.203) (0.073) (0.175) (0.905) (1.227)GDPgrowth 0.130*** 0.058*** 0.006* 0.006* 0.060***
(0.041) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017)Mktshare 0.859** 0.354*** 0.392*** 0.372*** 0.297
(0.386) (0.091) (0.099) (0.094) (0.336)Mktsize 0.749*** 0.702*** 0.747*** 0.755*** 0.839***
(0.045) (0.032) (0.030) (0.027) (0.038)PAR 1.586** 1.408*** 0.043 0.041 0.679***
(0.712) (0.264) (0.112) (0.095) (0.214)CAR 0.336 0.373*** 0.105 0.099 0.309
(0.242) (0.061) (0.083) (0.076) (0.236)YGLP 0.088 0.512** 0.328*** 0.275** 0.541**
(0.490) (0.210) (0.092) (0.112) (0.268)GLP/assets 0.615*** 0.645*** 0.445*** 0.447*** 0.573***
(0.206) (0.103) (0.167) (0.144) (0.151)DumAge 0.468*** 0.452*** 0.066 0.072* 0.391***
(0.159) (0.103) (0.041) (0.042) (0.132)DumReg 0.204* 0.058 0.267** 0.188 0.114
(0.108) (0.060) (0.108) (0.136) (0.147)Constant 4.497 2.564*** 2.517*** 2.884*** 3.826***
(5.351) (0.485) (0.405) (0.382) (0.572)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,693 4,693 4,693 4,693 4,650
R-squared 0.626 0.616 0.587 0.766 0.547
Number of MFIID/ groups 571 18 571 571 563Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 20.95*** 9.95***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 9.02
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 8.75 8.75Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 0.037 1.201
P-value Hansen test 0.846 0.273Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in this case 1% an d5% respectively). The critical value is obtained
from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only
for 3 or more instrumental variables).The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS
Size: Significance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of
instrumental variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 20%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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Regression results for Financial Performance: ROAVariables Group means Fama MacBeth Random Effects Random Effects
with IVInverse Probability
with IVSharia compliant 0.030 0.021* 0.035 0.095 0.057
(0.046) (0.012) (0.038) (0.077) (0.052)GDPgrowth 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)Mktshare 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.019
(0.024) (0.012) (0.036) (0.034) (0.018)Mktsize 0.015*** 0.010*** 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)PAR 0.218 0.176*** 0.064 0.067* 0.007
(0.190) (0.044) (0.046) (0.040) (0.024)CAR 0.097*** 0.056*** 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.086***
(0.030) (0.017) (0.024) (0.023) (0.012)YGLP 0.059 0.098 0.124*** 0.106** 0.022
(0.088) (0.059) (0.042) (0.044) (0.031)GLP/assets 0.068*** 0.092*** 0.041*** 0.040*** 0.047***
(0.025) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008)DumAge 0.000 0.035*** 0.005 0.006 0.015*
(0.028) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)DumReg 0.018 0.009 0.011 0.011 0.012
(0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.008)Constant 0.189 0.263*** 0.424*** 0.374*** 0.178***
(0.274) (0.061) (0.085) (0.060) (0.059)Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,379 4,379 4,379 4,379 4,338
R-squared 0.143 0.214 0.066 0.094 0.082
Number of MFIID/ groups 563 18 563 563 556Weak identification test
F-statistic of excluded instruments 19.37*** 8.97***
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Bias) 11.57 7.85
Stock-Yogo critical values (TSLS Size) 8.75 8.75Overidentification test of all instruments
Hansen Statistic 6.092 1.214
P-value Hansen test 0.014 0.271Notes: * refers to significant at 0.10%; ** significant at 0.05%; *** significant at 0.01%. Standard errors for Group means and RE estimates are
based on a bootstrapping method; For Random Effects with IV and Inverse Probability with IV standard errors are robust clustered standard
errors (with MFI as cluster). Group means refers to a between estimator (results based on Group means); Fama MacBeth refers to results using
the Fama MacBeth method; Random Effects refers to a random effects panel estimate; Random Effects with IV refers to a random effects with
instruments panel estimate and Inverse Probability with IV refers to panel estimate that combines inverse probability weighting and instru-
ments. The Stock-Yogo TSLS Bias critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS Bias: Significance level is 5%;
The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of instrumental variables (in our
case 2), and the desired maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS (in this case 1% and 10% respectively). The critical value is obtained
from Skeels and Windmeijer (2018) as Stock-Yogo do not present relative bias tables for 2 instrumental variables (it present bias tables only
for 3 or more instrumental variables). The Stock-Yogo TSLS Size critical values are critical values for the Weak Instrument Test Based on TSLS
Size: Significance level is 5%; The critical value is a function of the number of included endogenous regressors (in our case 1), the number of
instrumental variables (in our case 2), and the desired maximal size (in our case 20%) of a 5% Wald test of b = b0.
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